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Abstract	
	
Women’s	shifting	positions	in	common	public	space	have	contributed	significantly	to	the	
historical	 ebb	and	 flow	of	 Taiwan’s	 cosmopolitanism.	The	 importance	of	Austronesian	
and	 Bendi	本地	 contributions	 to	 Taiwan’s	 history	 are	 widely	 accepted,	 but	women’s	
roles	in	these	contributions	are	still	largely	overlooked.	Austronesian	women	facilitated	
the	 sociality	 across	 diversity	 that	 made	 Taiwan	 cosmopolitan	 under	 seventeenth-
century	Dutch	colonialism.	But	 cosmopolitanism	 is	a	 fragile	 social	niche,	and	 it	waned	
under	Qing	 settler	 colonialism.	 Taiwan’s	 post-1860	 forced	 reentry	 into	 global	 trade—
with	 a	 woman-processed	 product,	 tea,	 as	 its	 top	 export—again	 expanded	
cosmopolitanism	 under	 late	 Qing	 and	 early	 Japanese	 rule,	 also	 expanding	 Bendi	
women’s	 quotidian	 public	 engagements.	 Recovery	 from	 a	 long,	 war-related,	 mid-
twentieth-century	nadir	occurred	via	economic	development	that	was	driven	by	global	
trade	 and	 relied	 particularly	 on	 Bendi	 women’s	 labor.	 Historical	 intersectionality	 has	
repeatedly	enabled	social	linkages	for	burgeoning	cosmopolitanism	in	Taiwan.		
	
Keywords:	Taiwan,	cosmopolitanism,	gender,	 indigeneity,	public	 sphere,	Austronesian,	
Bendi,	ethnic	intermarriage,	global	trade,	historical	contingency	
	
Over	 the	 course	of	 hundreds	of	 structured	 life-history	 interviews	with	 rural	women—
mostly	 elderly	women—in	Taiwan	and	 the	People’s	Republic	of	China	 during	 the	past	
thirty	 years,	 I	 have	 found,	 not	 only	 that	women	over	 the	 past	 century	 have	 routinely	
made	substantial	economic	contributions	 to	 their	 families,	both	natal	and	marital;	not	
only	 that	 these	 contributions	 are	 routinely	 undervalued	 in	 household-level	 social	
crediting;	 but	 also	 that	 there	 is	 a	 qualitative	 difference	between	Taiwan	 and	China	 in	
whether	social	credit	is	conferred	at	all.	Taiwanese	women’s	contributions	might	often	
be	credited	at	less	than	their	actual	value,	but	they	were	never	unspeakable	in	the	way	
that	I	often	found	Chinese	women’s	contributions	to	be.	For	example,	in	rural	Hubei	in	
2010,	 after	 interviewing	 a	 woman	 in	 her	 nineties	 and	 learning	 how	 she	 had	 singly	
supported	her	six	children	during	the	war	years	by	weaving,	I	was	astonished	when	her	
sixty-something	son	came	home	and	proceeded	to	tell	me	that	 I	was	wasting	my	time	
asking	about	women’s	work	because	women	cannot	contribute	very	much,	certainly	not	
enough	 to	 make	 any	 difference	 to	 a	 family.	 But	 when	 I	 began	 to	 say	 what	 his	 own	
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mother	 had	 done,	 she	 cut	me	 off	 and	 shook	 her	 head—she	 did	 not	want	me	 to	 give	
social	recognition	of	her	contributions,	even	all	those	years	later.	Similarly,	poor	women	
in	Beijing	 avoided	 social	 credit	 for	 their	 contributions	 to	prevent	 their	 husbands	 from	
losing	 face	 (Evans	2017).	 But	 in	 Taiwan,	both	men	and	women	 talked	 very	matter-of-
factly	 about	 what	 women	 actually	 did—whether	 working	 in	 fields	 or	 factories—even	
though	they	might	often	value	women’s	contributions	less	than	men’s	(cf.	Harrell	[1982]	
2015,	 180).	Why	 this	 difference	 in	what	 is	 speakable	 about	women’s	 contributions	 in	
China	and	Taiwan?		
I	 suggest	 that	 the	 answer	 to	 this	 question	 lies	 in	 a	 larger	 historical	 pattern	 that	
differentiates	Taiwan	from	China:	acceptance	of	 local	women	 in	common	public	space	
and	 the	 relationship	of	women’s	public-sphere	participation	 to	 cosmopolitanism.1	This	
relationship	 is	 intersectional—with	 interwoven	 and	 mutually	 reinforcing	 influences	
between	gender	and,	in	this	case,	indigeneity.	Taiwan’s	multiple	historical	colonizations	
render	 indigeneity	 a	 relative	 and	 historically	 shifting	 concept:	 each	 new	 wave	 of	
colonizers	 took	 the	 local	 peoples	 already	 in	 place	 as	 indigenous,	 heedless	 of	 lumping	
together—for	example,	as	Bendi	本地	(local)2—descendants	of	earlier	colonizers	(Hoklo	
and	Hakka)	with	descendants	of	earlier	subalterns	(Austronesians)	(cf.	Brown	2004,	179,	
181–185)	(see	table	1).3	In	this	article,	I	illustrate	this	pattern,	examining	three	moments	
across	 Taiwan’s	 history—in	 the	 seventeenth,	 nineteenth,	 and	 twentieth	 centuries—
when	 a	 populous	 but	 subordinated	 (and	 ethnicized)	 category	 of	 local	 women	 were	
                                                     
1	Rather	than	a	Habermasian	bourgeois-	and	discourse-based	conception,	I	use	an	Arendtian	
“common”	conception	of	the	public	sphere—a	socially	constructed,	shared	space,	outside	the	
household,	of	human	material	culture	and	institutions	where	people	meet	and	engage	with	one	
another	(Arendt	[1958]	1998,	esp.	chap.	2;	d’Entreves	2019,	sec.	6.1).	
2	From	the	Qing	period	through	the	twentieth	century,	all	the	variants	of	Bendi	(in	table	1)	have	
been	used	to	refer	to	Hoklo	only,	especially	in	contrast	to	Hakka	(e.g.,	Tu	[1996,	1132]	and	Shih	
[2013],	who	uses	the	term	Tuzhu	土著	interchangeably	with	Bendi).	But	the	same	terms	have	
also	been	used	for	Hoklo	and	Hakka	combined	(e.g.,	Wang	F.	2013,	66).	The	combined	term	also	
includes	plains	Aborigine	peoples	who	had	assimilated	into	a	Han	identity;	many	of	these	people	
have	reasserted	an	Austronesian	identity	since	the	mid-1990s	(e.g.,	Brown	2004,	2010,	2020).	I	
use	the	term	“Bendi”	in	this	combined	sense	when	discussing	the	Qing,	Japanese	colonial,	and	
postwar	periods.				
3	Anthropological	debate	questions	whether	the	following	criteria	for	identifying	indigenous	
people	(used	by	the	United	Nations,	activists,	and	others)	reinstate	racist,	nineteenth-century	
notions	of	primitive	survivals	(e.g.,	Barnard	2006;	Guenther	et	al.	2006):	descended	from	people	
who	historically	preceded	other	settlers,	politically	subordinated,	culturally	different	from	the	
majority	population,	and	self-ascriptive	claimants	of	the	term	“indigenous.”	In	Taiwan’s	history,	
these	criteria	are	complicated	by	ethnic	intermarriage,	changes	in	political	dominance	and	
alliances,	acculturation,	and	assimilation	(Brown	2004).	I	use	“Bendi”	as	a	category	of	indigeneity	
in	the	broad	sense	of	“locals,”	recognizing	that	it	derives	from	a	context	of	multiple	colonizations	
and	refers	to	peoples	who	have	an	ascribed	identity	of	the	earliest	Han	colonists	(Hoklo	and	
Hakka)—not	an	ascribed	identity	of	any	of	Taiwan’s	original	inhabitants	(Austronesians),	
regardless	of	some	Bendi	having	some	Austronesian	ancestry.		
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themselves	 cosmopolitan	 actors—contributing	 importantly	 to	 a	 larger	 communitarian	
(community-building)	 engagement	 across	 diversity.	 Various	 masking	 processes	 can	
make	it	difficult	to	recognize	women’s	contributions,	even	when	they	are	present	in	the	
historical	 and	 ethnographic	 records.	 But	 those	 intersectional	 contributions	 show	 that	
cosmopolitanism	has	been	a	fragile	but	recurrent	social	niche	across	Taiwan’s	history.	
	
Table	1.	Ethnic	groups	in	Taiwan’s	History	
	
Han	漢*	 Austronesian**	
Hoklo	福佬,	閩南	 Plains	
Aborigines	
Mountain	
Aborigines	
Zhangzhou	漳州	 Siraya	
Quanzhou	泉州	 Favorolang	
Anxi	安溪	
Tongan	同安	
Hakka	客家	
Sanyi	三邑***	
Many	other	
groups	
Mainlanders	外省
人	
(after	1945)	
	
Bendi	本地	(also	Hontōjin	本島人,	Benshengren	本省
人,	or	Taiwanese	台灣人)	
Many	
groups	
*	Other	terms	for	this	ethnic	group	include	Hua	華	and	Tang	唐.	
**	Many	Qing	documents	refer	to	Austronesians	as	barbarians	(fan	番),	often	distinguishing	
between	“civilized”	(shu	熟,	lit.,	“cooked”)	peoples,	who	lived	on	the	western	plains,	and	“wild”	
(sheng	生,	lit.,	“raw”)	peoples,	who	lived	in	the	mountains	and	on	the	eastern	plains	(Brown	2004,	
2010;	Teng	2004).	Japanese	and	Mainlander	colonial	governments	treated	mountain	
Austronesians	(J.	takasago高砂;		gaoshanzu	高山族)	differently	than	Bendi.		
***	Sanyi	was	an	alliance	of	people	from	Jinjiang	晋江,	Nan’an	南安,	and	Hui’an	惠安.		
	
Gendering	Cosmopolitanism	
	
“Cosmopolitan”	is	a	word	like	“culture,”	whose	polysemic	range	includes	contradictions.	
Each	term	has	a	general	meaning	implying	the	sophisticated	worldliness	associated	with	
elite	 levels	of	wealth	that	facilitate	education	and	travel.	These	popular	meanings	may	
apply	 to	 individuals,	 who	 are	 “cosmopolitan”	 and	 “cultured,”	 or	 to	 places,	 which	 are	
“urbane”	(assumed	to	be	urban	as	well	as	central).	These	meanings	imply	a	contrasting	
barbaric	 condition	 or	 periphery,	 labeled	 with	 a	 variety	 of	 derisive	 terms	 including	
“provincial,”	 “hick,”	 and	 “rustic.”	 In	 short,	 these	 popular	meanings	 are	 attributions	 of	
civilization	formulated	by	metropole	elites.		
By	 contrast,	 in	 a	 social-science	 framework,	 all	 humans	 have	 culture	 (shared	
meaningful	ideas	that	shape	people’s	understanding	of	their	world)	and	all	humans	are	
potentially	 cosmopolitan.	 Philosophers	 talk	 about	 cosmopolitanism	 as	 an	 ethical	
orientation	or	moral	principle	that	embraces	an	identity	as	a	“citizen	of	the	world”	(from	
the	 Greek	 kosmopolitês)	 over	 other	 collective	 identities,	 especially	 those	 linked	 to	
membership	 in	a	 family	or	clan,	or	membership	 in	a	city-state	or	nation-state	 (Appiah	
2006).	 Citizenship	 implies	 community,	 one	 that	 is	 neither	 exclusionary	 nor	 elitist—
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cosmopolitanism	as	“the	 idea	that	all	human	beings	belong	non-exclusively	 to	a	single	
community”	 (Duara	 2015,	 21).	 This	 view	 emphasizes	 (a)	 individuality,	 by	 taking	
individuals	 as	 the	 basic	 unit	 of	 moral	 concern;	 (b)	 universality,	 by	 viewing	 every	
individual	as	having	equal	moral	value;	and	(c)	generality,	by	holding	all	individuals—not	
merely	those	with	whom	we	share	ties—as	worthy	of	moral	concern	to	every	one	of	us	
(Taraborrelli	2015,	xiv).	First	one	takes	 individuals	as	the	basic	unit,	 then	one	views	all	
individuals	with	whom	one	has	personal	connections	to	be	equally	valuable,	and	finally	
one	grants	value	to	strangers.4	But	classification	of	human	beings	by	gender	does	not	fit	
neatly	 into	 this	 framework.	 Although	 every	 society	 necessarily	 has	 ties	 between	men	
and	women—and	across	gender	differences,	more	broadly—many	patriarchal	societies	
readily	 accept	 the	 moral	 equivalence	 of	 men,	 despite	 differences	 that	 make	 them	
strangers,	while	refusing	to	recognize	women	(and	other	feminized	genders)	as	morally	
equal	 to	 men.	 Theorizations	 of	 cosmopolitanism	 need	 to	 include	 all	 human	 beings	
present	in	a	community.		
In	 defining	 the	 community,	 however—especially	within	 the	universalist	 view	of	 a	
single,	global	community—lies	a	 tension	between	the	high	 levels	of	 face-to-face	social	
engagement,	 cooperation,	 and	 mutual	 support	 implicit	 in	 the	 concept	 of	 community	
(Halperin	1998)	and	the	necessarily	imagined	character	of	social	interactions	on	a	global	
scale	 (Anderson	 1983;	 cf.	 Appiah	 2006,	 135).	 Circulation	 of	written	works	 creates	 the	
potential	 for	 imagining	connections	 to	distant	places	and	peoples—a	“cosmopolis,”	or	
sphere	of	soft-power	influence.	Women	and	commoners	are	not	excluded	per	se	from	
such	 a	 cosmopolis,	 but	 literacy	 is	 necessarily	 limited	 to	 those	 classes	who	 can	 afford	
education	 and,	 in	many	 times	 and	 places,	 to	 boys	 and	men.	 For	 empires	 that	 used	 a	
phonetic	alphabet	and	widely	promoted	 literacy,	such	connections	were	possible	for	a	
range	of	economic	classes,	via	newspapers	and	other	print	media	(e.g.,	Lewis	2009).	But	
fewer	 commoners	 and	 elite	 women	 accessed	 the	 literary	 “great	 traditions”	 found	 in	
South	 Asia	 using	 Sanskrit	 (Pollock	 2006),	 in	maritime	 South	 and	 Southeast	 Asia	 using	
Arabic	 (Ricci	 2011),	 or	 in	 East	 and	Northeast	 Asia	 using	 classical	 Chinese	 (Park	 2017).	
Moreover,	 colonial	 subjects,	 with	 restricted	 access	 to	 the	 imperial	 metropole	 and	 its	
knowledge,	 were	 precluded	 from	 cosmopolitan	 status	 because	 of	 their	 subaltern	
identity	 (S.	 Shih	 2001,	 97).	 Such	 exclusionary	 imagined	 communities—regardless	 of	
whether	 the	 inequality	 is	 imagined	 via	 gender,	 class,	 religion,	 race,	 or	 some	 other	
concept—necessarily	attribute	cosmopolitanism	in	terms	of	purported	civilization.		
By	 contrast,	 approaches	 to	 cosmopolitanism	 that	 examine	 whether	 empirical	
interactions	 among	 social	 actors	 are	 communitarian—whether	 they	 “practice”	
community	(Halperin	1998)	and	whether	these	linkages	cross	lines	of	difference	(Appiah	
2006,	 79;	 Delanty	 2012;	 Nascimento	 2013,	 124–132)—allow	 for	 the	 potential	 to	 find	
cosmopolitanism	within	 conditions	 of	 inequality.	 In	 these	 communitarian	 approaches,	
cosmopolitanism	is	experienced	at	the	 level	of	ordinary	 individuals,	not	merely	among	
the	elite;	everyone’s	first	potential	exposure	to	cosmopolitanism	is	 local;	and	a	person	
                                                     
4	Delanty	(2012,	341)	does	not	assume	progression.		
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growing	up	in	a	cosmopolitan	place	may	be	cosmopolitan	without	ever	having	left	that	
place.5	
There	 are	 significant	 differences	 between	 conceptualizing	 cosmopolitanism	 in	
terms	of	such	a	person	engaged	 in	diversity-crossing	 local	social	networks,	on	the	one	
hand,	 and	 an	 individual	 who	 uses	 literature	 to	 leapfrog	 “provincial”	 attitudes	 and	
connect	 to	 a	 larger	 cosmopolis,	 on	 the	 other.6	These	 conceptualizations	 differ	 in	 the	
type	 of	 underlying	 linkages.	 Viewing	 cosmopolitanism	 as	 a	 specific	 connection	 to	 the	
cosmopolis	 (or	 the	 global)	 relies	 on	 imagined,	 often	 literary,	 linkages.	 By	 contrast,	
viewing	 cosmopolitanism	 as	 diversely	 engaged	 local	 networks	 relies	 on	 face-to-face	
linkages	that	build	community.7	
In	gendering	cosmopolitanism,	we	need	to	recognize	how	gender	influences	these	
different	 linkages.	Because	women	 in	patriarchal	societies	often	are—or	are	supposed	
to	 be—cloistered	 (to	 varying	 degrees),	 individual	 women	 rarely	 achieve	
cosmopolitanism	by	 leapfrogging	 local	conditions	and	usually	do	so	only	with	extreme	
wealth.	Elite	women’s	knowledge	of	 international	fashion,	however,	often	signals	their	
entire	household’s	“cosmopolitan”	connections	to	the	colonial	or	global	metropole.8	At	
the	local	level,	even	in	patriarchal	societies,	face-to-face	interactions	between	men	and	
women	 are	 not	 usually	 perceived	 as	 engaging	 across	 diversity—perhaps	 because	
women	are	often	viewed	as	“helpers,”	not	as	fully	autonomous	and	contributing	social	
agents	 (Brown	 2017).	 Moreover,	 women’s	 ability	 to	 practice	 communitarian	 social	
interactions	 across	 recognized	 diversity	 in	 their	 quotidian	 lives	 is	 often	 class-related,	
with	 women	 at	 the	 more	 modest	 end	 of	 the	 wealth	 spectrum	 often	 having	 more	
freedom	for	diverse	social	engagement.	
For	a	local	society	to	be	cosmopolitan	in	this	communitarian	sense,	diversity	is	not	
sufficient,	 as	 the	 nationalistic	 and	 racist	 violence	 of	 contemporary	 identity	 politics	
reminds	 us	 only	 too	 urgently.	 But	 engagement	 across	 that	 diversity—the	 kind	 of	
engagement	that	builds	and	maintains	community,	the	kind	necessary	for	conversations	
and	 cooperative	 ventures,	 the	 kind	 that	 is	 the	 antithesis	 of	 identity-based	 violence—
may	 be	 sufficient.	 Engagement	 requires	 treating	 others	 with	 civility	 and	 taking	 them	
seriously	 as	 social	 actors—what	 we	 might	 consider	 respect.	 Thus,	 communitarian	
approaches	examine	the	networked	quotidian	social	 interactions	of	all	the	people	who	
actually	live	in	a	place,	and	these	approaches	consider	a	place	cosmopolitan	because	a	
significant	proportion	of	people	living	there	have	regular	social	interactions	that	engage	
across	differences	(e.g.,	Lewis	2009;	Fewkes	2014).		
Documenting	emically	salient	diversity	is	therefore	only	the	first	step	of	identifying	
historical	 cases	 of	 communitarian	 cosmopolitanism.	 We	 must	 consider	 evidence	 of	
engagement	 across	 that	 diversity—such	 as	 interethnic	 marriage	 and	 economic	
                                                     
5	These	approaches	cut	across	the	social	sciences,	philosophy,	and	legal	studies.		
6	See	Nascimento	(2013,	211–223)	on	multiple	cosmopolitanisms.	
7	For	theoretical	discussion	of	social	linkages,	see	Brown	and	Feldman	(2009).	
8	Sometimes	also	perceived	as	“modern”	(e.g.,	Lewis	2009),	such	signaling	can	be	viewed	quite	
differently	in	colonial	spaces	versus	in	the	metropole	(S.	Shih	2001).		
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cooperation—in	 contrast	 to	 evidence	 of	 exclusionary	 discrimination	 and	 violence.	We	
cannot	 expect	 every	 person	 in	 any	 population	 to	 have	 cosmopolitan	 engagements;	
rather,	we	must	consider	whether	the	evidence	of	quotidian	engagements	is	such	that	
most	 people	 in	 the	 population	 experienced	 it.	 I	 argue	 that	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 include	
women—and	 gender	 more	 broadly—in	 the	 diversity	 across	 which	 tolerance	 and	
cooperation	 are	measured	 because	 social	 interactions	 are	 necessarily	 operationalized	
through	 gendered	 categories	 and	 all	 self-replicating	 communities	 necessarily	 include	
women	as	well	as	men.		
	
Austronesian	Women	and	Seventeenth-Century	Marital	Networks	
	
Written	records	suggest	that	southwestern	Taiwan	was	a	cosmopolitan	place	during	the	
mid-seventeenth	century,	and	historians	have	examined	cooperation	as	well	as	tensions	
across	European,	Austronesian,	and	Han	ethnolinguistic	boundaries.9	But	Austronesian	
women—who	 are	 mentioned	 repeatedly	 in	 the	 Dutch	 records	 in	 particular—receive	
little	 credit.	 I	 argue	 that	 Austronesian	 women	 made	 essential	 contributions	 to	
interethnic	cooperation.	Moreover,	I	suggest	that	Austronesian	women’s	public	visibility	
laid	the	social	and	cultural	foundation	for	later	generations	of	women	to	work	in	public.			
When	the	Dutch	arrived	during	the	early	seventeenth	century,	Taiwan’s	indigenous	
peoples	spoke	dozens	of	distinct,	mutually	unintelligible	Austronesian	languages.	Trade	
and	colonization	brought	at	least	a	half	dozen	more	languages.	From	the	1620s	through	
the	 1660s,	 the	 Dutch	 East	 India	 Company	 (Vereenigde	 Oost-Indische	 Compagnie,	
hereafter	VOC)	worked	to	consolidate	colonial	control	over	Taiwan.	Although	the	Dutch	
in	 Taiwan	 never	 numbered	 more	 than	 twelve	 hundred,	 they	 suppressed	 endemic	
Austronesian	 warfare	 on	 the	 plains,	 first	 controlling	 and	 later	 relying	 on	 military	
assistance	from	the	Siraya	and	other	Austronesians	living	nearest	to	the	Dutch	forts	(in	
present-day	Tainan).	Missionaries	converted	Austronesians	to	Christianity,	overthrowing	
the	indigenous	woman-led	religious	practices	and	pushing	newlyweds	to	settle	 in	their	
own	(neolocal)	home	and	start	raising	children	immediately.	These	colonial	efforts	led	to	
increases	 in	 the	 Siraya	 population	 overall	 and	 in	 the	 number	 of	 women	 available	 for	
marriage	during	 the	1640s	and	1650s,	 a	 crucial	Han	 immigration	period	 (Brown	2004,	
136–153).	
In	1650,	the	plains	Aborigine	population	was	about	twenty-six	thousand.	The	Han	
population	 grew	 from	 a	 few	 hundred	 in	 1622	 to	 several	 thousand	 in	 1640,	 fifteen	
                                                     
9	See,	for	example,	Shi	([1685]	1958),	Huang	([1736]	1957),	Campbell	(1896,	1903),	Thompson	
(1964,	1969),	Blussé	(1984,	1990,	2003),	Blussé	and	Roessingh	(1984),	Huber	(1990),	Shepherd	
(1993,	1995),	Pan	Y.	(1992,	1993),	L.	Wang	(1995),	Brown	(1996,	2004,	2008),	Teng	(1998,	2004),	
Chan	and	Chang	(2001),	Everts	and	Milde	(2003),	Heyns	(2003),	Andrade	(2005).	Of	these,	only	
Brown,	Teng,	and	Everts	and	Milde	emphasize	the	importance	of	Austronesian	women.	Notably,	
Andrade	(esp.	2007,	2012)	consistently	ignores	women’s	contributions	in	his	analyses	of	Taiwan’s	
historical	plurality.	For	more	recent	views	of	Austronesian	identity,	see	I.	Pan	(2000)	and	Hsieh	
(2018).	
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thousand	 in	 1650,	 and	 an	 estimated	 twenty-five	 thousand	men	by	 1661.	Han	women	
were	rare,	certainly	less	than	10	percent	of	the	population;	European	women	were	even	
rarer.	 Yet	 Dutch	 sources	 report	 that	 many	 Han	 and	 European	men	married	 and	 had	
families.	By	1650,	almost	half	 the	population	under	Dutch	control	was	either	of	mixed	
Han-Austronesian	ancestry	or	living	in	mixed	households	(Brown	2004,	141).10	The	male-
biased	 population	 sex	 ratio	meant	 that	 Austronesian	women	were	 necessary	 to	 local	
social	dynamics,	but	it	did	not	in	itself	give	women	power.	
Women	were	important	members	of	Siraya	communities	in	their	own	right.	Gender	
division	of	labor	upon	Dutch	contact	made	farming—swidden,	dry-field	agriculture—the	
province	 of	 women,	 and	 their	 matrilineality	 (calculating	 inheritance	 through	 one’s	
mother),	meant	that	Siraya	women	owned	the	agricultural	fields.	Young	men	left	their	
mothers’	homes	to	live	collectively	in	a	men’s	house,	moving	through	a	militarized	age-
grade	 system	 that	 focused	 on	 warfare	 and	 hunting;	 Siraya	 men	 only	 moved	 to	 their	
wives’	 homes	 to	 do	 agricultural	 work	 and	 raise	 children	 after	 retirement,	 when	 they	
were	in	their	forties.	Siraya	women	chose	their	own	husbands	and	shocked	both	Dutch	
and	Chinese	with	their	willingness	to	engage	in	sexual	activity,	whether	married	or	not.	
Perhaps	their	attitude	was	due	to	the	fact	that	they	had	access	to	a	reliable	means	of	
fertility	control	that	preserved	not	only	the	life	of	the	woman	but	her	future	fertility.11	
Austronesian	 women’s	 local	 agricultural	 expertise	 and	 kin	 networks	 were	 probably	
viewed	 positively	 by	 Han	 men	 seeking	 marriage	 partners.	 Austronesian	 women’s	
presence	 in	 publicly	 visible	 spaces	 was	 striking	 to	 seventeenth-century	 Chinese	
observers—no	doubt	 for	 their	 flagrant	disregard	of	neo-Confucian	 ideals.	Not	only	did	
Austronesian	women	work	in	agricultural	fields	with	men	but	they	also	danced	publicly	
during	festivals	(figures	1	and	2).12	
Also	crucial	to	plains	Aborigine	women’s	social	 importance	was	the	fact	that	both	
Dutch	and	Han	 invested	 in	 learning	to	speak	Siraya	and	other	Austronesian	 languages.	
The	 VOC	 economically	 and	 politically	 supported	 missionaries	 and	 schoolteachers	 in	
many	 Austronesian	 villages	 to	 learn	 the	 local	 languages	 as	 a	 means	 of	 both	
proselytization	 and	 political	 control.	 This	 continued	 investment	 despite	 clear	 tensions	
throughout	 the	 Dutch	 records	 between	 VOC	 officials	 and	 missionaries	 suggests	 how	
fundamental	Austronesian	peoples	were	 to	 the	Dutch	 colony—for	 the	deer	 trade	and	
for	military	control	of	the	plains.	Many	Han	learned	Austronesian	languages	sufficiently	
to	become	middlemen—collecting	the	tribal	tax	imposed	by	the	Dutch	and	holding	VOC-
licensed	monopoly	rights	to	purchase	specified	goods,	such	as	deerskins	or	sugarcane.	
The	Han	and	European	men	who	married	Austronesian	women	enhanced	bilingualism,	
for	husband	and	wife	and	for	their	children.		
	
                                                     
10	This	estimate	is	consistent	with	genetic	research	(S.	Chen	2008).		
11	Shepherd	(1995)	discusses	seventeenth-century	Dutch	reports	that	Siraya	externally	
manipulated	a	woman’s	abdomen	to	cause	abortion.	
12	The	woodblock	print	images	in	these	figures	are	from	the	eighteenth	century;	thus,	the	
Austronesians	depicted	here	were	already	subject	to	a	hundred	years	of	colonization.		
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Figure	1.	Woodblock	prints	of	plains	Aborigine	women	and	men	working	together	in	the	fields	to	
plant	(left)	and	harvest	(right)	rice.	Men	are	bare-chested,	women	fully	clothed.	Source:	Preface	
to	the	Zhuluo	Xianzhi	諸羅縣志	([1717]	1962,	1:40,	41),	the	earliest	extant	collection	of	
ethnographic	illustrations	depicting	Taiwan’s	Austronesian	peoples	(Teng	2004,	152).		
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The	 network	 of	 marital	 ties	 in	 Dutch	 Taiwan	 had	 implications	 for	 access	 to	
resources	and	 implementation	of	policies.	Many	Han	middlemen	had	plains	Aborigine	
wives.	 These	 middlemen	 purchased	 from	 not	 only	 Austronesians	 but	 also	 any	 Han	
agriculturalists	 living	in	their	 licensed	territories,	many	of	whom	also	had	Austronesian	
wives.	Moreover,	
	
it	 was	 not	 unusual	 for	 [VOC]	 Company	 employees,	 especially	
schoolteachers	who	as	a	rule	were	living	in	the	midst	of	their	pupils,	to	
marry	 a	 converted	 [Christian]	 village	 girl.…	 [T]he	 fact	 that	 Governor	
Coyett	mentions	 [that	German	schoolteacher	Hendrick	Noorden’s	wife	
is	 a	 “native	 woman”	 when	 recording	 Noorden’s	 1657	 promotion	 to	
Figure	2.	Woodblock	
print	of	plains	
Aborigine	women	
dancing	in	an	outdoor	
common	public	space	
for	a	festival.	Source:	
Preface	to	the	Zhuluo	
Xianzhi	諸羅縣志	
([1717]	1962,	1:43).	
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political	administrator	over	the	southern	territories	under	Dutch	control]	
leads	us	to	suspect	that	Noorden’s	wife,	[baptized	as]	Maria,	somehow	
played	an	active	part	in	the	network	of	relations	between	the	Company	
personnel	 and	 the	 indigenous	 population.	Was	 she	 also	 the	 one	 who	
taught	her	husband	to	speak	the	language	of	her	people	so	well?	(Everts	
and	Milde	2003,	245)	
	
Remembering	 Han	 intermarriage	 in	 these	 same	 villages,	 it	 is	 not	 so	 surprising	
that—despite	 orders	 from	 their	 VOC	 superiors	 in	 Batavia	 to	 remove	 all	 Chinese	 from	
Austronesian	 villages—in	 1642,	 the	 Taiwan	 VOC	 allowed	 Han	 to	 remain	 in	 six	
communities	 near	 the	 Dutch	 stronghold	 as	 well	 as	 in	 the	 village	 of	 Favorlang	 (some	
twenty-five	 miles	 north,	 in	 central	 Taiwan),	 “because	 the	 Dutch	 civil	 administration	
stationed	in	these	villages	could	keep	an	eye	on	their	activities”	(Heyns	2003,	182).	The	
Batavia	VOC	did	not	accept	these	accommodations,	and	further	movement	occurred	in	
1644.	The	Dutch	administrators	and	the	Han	men	living	in	the	villages	were	married	into	
the	 same	 matrilineal	 Austronesian	 network—they	 were	 marital	 kin—something	 the	
Taiwan	VOC	knew	well	but	probably	thought	better	of	telling	their	superiors	in	Batavia.	
Marital	ties	were	always	local	and	thus	capable	of	micro-level	feedback	to	larger	social	
pressures.	 Consequently,	 Han-Austronesian	 intermarriage	 could	 cause	 trouble	 for	 the	
Dutch,	 as	 these	 ties	 in	 Favorlang	 did	 from	 about	 1635	 until	 1645	 or	 so.	 “Favorlang	
Chinese”—	married	 to	 local	Austronesian	women	and	with	 their	own	 ties	 to	 seafaring	
Han—diverted	deer	and	crops	to	Han	smugglers,	circumventing	VOC	licensing	and	fees;	
Favorlang	 Chinese	 attacked	 “Dutch	 Chinese,”	 with	 VOC	 licenses,	 and	 encouraged	
Austronesian	resistance	to	Dutch	control	(Andrade	2005).		
Marital	 ties	 gave	 Austronesians	 access	 to	 both	 Dutch	 and	 Han	 networks.	 VOC	
Governor	Van	Nuyts,	who	bungled	diplomacy	with	the	Tokugawa	shogunate	and	left	his	
position	in	disgrace,	was	criticized	for	a	long-term	liaison	with	an	Austronesian	woman	
(he	 also	 had	 a	 wife	 in	 the	 Netherlands)	 (Blussé	 2003;	 Clulow	 2014).	 Such	matrilineal	
connections—to	 the	 VOC	 administration,	 Dutch	 and	 German	 missionaries,	 Han	
middlemen,	and	Han	agriculturalists—may	explain	how	some	plains	Aborigines	became	
registered	landlords,	sponsoring	the	clearing	of	forests	and	the	establishment	of	paddy	
fields	by	Han	in	exchange	for	tenancy	rights;	the	Taiwan	VOC	allowed	and	even	recorded	
several	instances	of	such	registration,	which	the	Batavia	VOC	later	rejected	(Heyns	2003).	
Plains	Aborigine	marital	ties,	however,	appear	not	to	have	extended	to	Han	merchants	
in	town	near	the	Dutch	forts,	for	these	men	were	wealthy	enough	to	bring	wives	from	
China	(or	elsewhere).		
Opportunities	for	Taiwan	residents	to	thrive	existed,	but	they	required	the	ability	to	
engage	 networks	 across	 ethnolinguistic	 differences.	 Taiwan’s	 natural	 resource	 wealth	
lay	not	only	in	existing	deer	herds	(hunted	to	extinction	by	about	1730)	but	also	in	the	
land’s	 lush	 potential	 for	 agriculture	 (and	 later	 in	 sulfur	 and	 camphor	 extraction).	 Han	
merchants	and	the	VOC	recruited	Han	men	to	migrate	 from	China	 (mostly	Fujian)	and	
both	Han	and	Dutch—and	later	Austronesians—sponsored	Han	laborers	and	farmers	to	
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clear	forestland	for	commercial	production	of	rice	(in	paddy	fields)	and	sugarcane	(in	dry	
fields).	 Interethnic	 cooperation	 was	 necessary	 to	 identify	 appropriate	 land;	 ensure	
peaceful	access;	organize	and	supply	work	 teams;	plant,	protect,	harvest,	and	process	
crops;	pay	VOC	duties;	and	arrange	shipping	 to	 the	global	market.	 In	 this	context,	 the	
identity	politics	of	the	day	hinged	on	taxation,	trade,	and	language,	all	of	which	marital	
ties	could	potentially	mediate.		
The	documented	practices	of	Austronesian	women	must	have	disrupted	Han	and	
Dutch	gendered	notions	of	public	space	and	roles,	but	neither	Dutch	nor	Han	colonizers	
could	prescribe	all	women’s	public	activities	(figures	1	and	2).	Surely	the	demography—
a	 population	 sex-ratio	 imbalance,	 much	 larger	 proportions	 of	 Austronesians	 to	
Europeans,	and,	initially	at	least,	larger	proportions	of	Austronesians	to	Han—combined	
with	 knowledge	 of	 the	 local	 environment	 and	 regional	 customs	 to	 give	 Austronesian	
women	leverage	to	maintain	many	public	practices,	especially	those	related	to	marital	
networks	and	resource	management.	It	is	difficult	to	say	precisely	what	women’s	status	
was,	 relative	 to	 that	of	men	during	 the	Dutch	period,	 given	 that	 the	 records	we	have	
were	written	by	men	(European	and	Chinese)	from	patriarchal	societies.	It	seems	likely	
that	the	status	of	women	declined—not	only	from	the	Dutch	measures	to	disempower	
Siraya	women	who	were	religious	leaders,	but	also	as	the	proportion	of	Han	men	in	the	
local	population	grew.13	However,	 because	 the	 skewed	demographic	 context	obtained	
through	both	 the	Zheng	and	early	Qing	periods,	 the	 visible	participation	of	women	 in	
the	 public	 sphere	 very	 likely	 continued	 for	 more	 than	 a	 century.	 I	 suggest	 that	 this	
lengthy	 visibility	 established	 a	 historically	 important	 social	 foundation,	 one	 that	 may	
have	survived	in	cultural	memory.	
	
Bendi	Women	Processing	Tea,	1860–1910		
	
Qing	Taiwan	(1683–1895)	was	by	all	accounts	distinctly	not	cosmopolitan—notorious	as	
it	 was	 for	 ethnic	 and	 rebellious	 violence.	 Notably,	 cosmopolitanism	 ebbed	 and	 then	
reemerged	in	correlation	with	women’s	quotidian	visibility	in	public.	Because	it	is	easier	
to	 see	 the	 connection	 of	women’s	 visibility	 to	 cosmopolitanism	with	 their	 resurgence	
than	with	their	diminution,	I	focus	here	on	women’s	role	in	the	global	tea	trade	and	its	
implications.			
Qing	 administrative	management	 has	 been	 criticized	 as	 chronically	 understaffed,	
thus	 failing	 to	 prevent	 Han	 settlers’	 encroachment	 on	 tax-paying	 Austronesians’	 land	
rights	 and	 fomenting	 the	 growth	 of	 Han	 strongmen	with	 ethnic-based	militia	 (Meskill	
1979;	Shepherd	1993;	C.	Chen	1999),	but	it	could	be	interpreted	instead	as	a	deliberate	
                                                     
13	Centuries	later,	anthropologists	noted	the	greater	willingness	of	people	in	Taiwan	and	
southern	China	than	in	northern	China	to	allow	women	to	“stand	in”	for	men	when	
circumstances	or	skill	called	for	it	(A.	Wolf	1985;	A.	Wolf	and	Huang	1980;	Cohen	1976).	This	
proclivity	may	constitute	cultural	substrate	influences	of	Austronesian	and	Tai	ancestors	(A.	Wolf	
1989;	Brown	2004;	S.	Chen	2008).	For	evidence	of	such	deep-history	cultural	substrate	influences	
elsewhere	in	the	world,	see	Fortunato,	Holden,	and	Mace	(2006),	and	Tehrani	(2013).		
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strategy	of	settler	colonialism	(cf.	Herman	2018).	After	1788,	when	the	ban	on	women	
settlers	was	permanently	lifted,	most	Han	settlers	could	marry	and	work	endogamously,	
even	within	county-level	native-place	groups	(table	1),	creating	few	engagements	across	
ethnolinguistic	distinctions	(Brown	2004,	156).	Faced	with	159	major	uprisings	and	feuds	
between	1684	and	1895,	Qing	officials	exploited	ethnic	tensions,	supplementing	troops	
with	rival	militias	(Lamley	1981;	Harrell	1990;	Shepherd	1993;	C.	Chen	1999).	By	1860,	
cosmopolitanism	reached	a	nadir.		
After	1860,	Taiwan’s	early	nineteenth-century	insular	focus	on	the	eco-engineering	
and	 ethnic	 competition	 of	 settler	 colonialism	 shifted	 to	 global	 markets.	 European	
unequal	treaties	opened	Taiwan’s	ports	to	international	trade	(figure	3).	After	1878,	20	
percent	 of	 Taiwan’s	 population	 was	 involved	 in	 export	 production	 of	 tea,	 sugar,	 or	
camphor	(Ka	1995,	35).	By	1881,	 tea	had	surpassed	sugar	to	become	Taiwan’s	 leading	
global	 export	 (Gardella	 1999,	 167).	 Global	 trade	 interests	 necessitated	 cooperative	
interactions	 for	 resource	 extraction,	 refinement,	 and	 shipping.	 Incursions	 into	 the	
forested	territories	of	mountain	Austronesians	to	cut	trees,	set	up	camphor	stills,	and,	
later,	 plant	 tea	 increased.	 Qing	 official	 oversight	 of	 developing	 the	 tea	 and	 camphor	
trade	 lay	 with	 the	 Settler’s	 Annexation	 Bureau	 (Fuken	 ju	撫墾局)14—an	 office	 that	
profited	Han	militia	 leaders.	 In	1888,	 for	example,	 the	Lins	of	Wufeng	 received	a	 land	
grant	 of	 several	 thousand	 hectares	 with	 virgin	 camphor	 stands	 in	 the	 hills	 near	
Zhanghua,	after	Lin	militia	suppressed	three	mountain	Aborigine	uprisings	(Meskill	1979,	
186–189,	 191,	 240–242;	 Gardella	 1999,	 181).	 Were	 these	 uprisings	 strictly	 about	
resource	 exploitation,	 or	 were	 they	 like	 the	 1731	 uprising	 in	 nearby	 Dajiaxi	大甲西,	
where	 Han	 abuse	 of	 Austronesian	 women	 doing	 corvée	 labor	 work	 (Shepherd	 1999,	
117)—that	 is,	 public-sphere	 labor—led	 to	 violence?	 Similar	 to	 Dutch-era	 strategies,	
some	Han	(and	later	Japanese)	men	married	mountain	Aborigine	women	sharing	profits	
with	 their	 in-laws,	 who	 then	 supported	 these	 resource-extraction	 practices	 to	 other	
Austronesians	(e.g.,	P.	Barclay	2005).	When	such	mediation	failed,	as	it	did	at	least	nine	
times	between	1875	and	1892,	Qing	authorities	used	plains	Aborigine	militia	to	quell	the	
armed	resistance.	
	
	
	
                                                     
14	The	common	translation	“Pacification	and	Reclamation	Bureau”	is	socially	inaccurate.	Although	
“pacification”	conveys	the	ambiguity	of	fu	撫	as	both	mollification	and	military	subjugation,	
“reclamation”	fails	to	capture	the	imperialist	mindset	that	virgin	forests	are	“wastelands”	
appropriately	annexed	for	agriculture	(kaiken	開墾,	lit.,	“opening	wasteland”).				
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Figure	3.	Map	of	Taiwan	(1896).	Place	names	are	written	using	the	Presbyterian	Church	
romanization	of	Minnan;	here,	I	provide	the	Mandarin	pinyin	romanization,	as	used	in	the	article,	
with	the	map	romanization	in	parentheses.	The	inset	map	shows	Taiwan	in	relation	to	the	
Japanese	archipelago,	notably	the	port	of	Nagasaki	長崎;	to	the	Chinese	mainland,	notably	the	
province	of	Fujian	福建	(Fo-kien)	and	its	ports	of	Fuzhou	福州	(Fu-chow)	and	Xiamen	廈門	
(Amoy);	and	to	the	peninsula	of	Korea	(Corea).	The	main	map	shows,	on	the	western	coast,	from	
south	to	central:	Gaoxiong	高雄	(Ta-kow),	Tainan	臺南	(Tai-nan),	Anping	安平	(An-peng),	Lugang	
(Lok-kang;	once	Favorlang),	and	Zhanghua	(Chiang-hoa).	On	the	northern	tip	of	the	island,	from	
west	to	east,	are	Danshui	淡水	(Tam-sui),	Dadaocheng	大稻埕	(Twa-tu-tia),	Mengjia	艋舺	(Bang-
ka),	Taipei	臺北	(Tai-pak),	and	Jilong	基隆	(Ke-lung).	Source:	Campbell	(1896),	available	in	the	
Reed	College	digital	archive,	Formosa:	Nineteenth-Century	Images,	
https://rdc.reed.edu/c/formosa/s/r?_pp=20&s=8aacb88ffe734e9f95ef48bb65c9043aaf09b189&
p=10&pp=1.	
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During	 their	 rule	 (1895–1945),	 Japanese	 colonizers’	 immediate	 encounters	 with	
armed	 resistance,	 disease,	 and	 poor	 infrastructure	 led	 to	 substantial	 investment	 in	
public-health	measures,	a	policing	system,	railways,	and	roads	(Ts’ai	2009).	Cognizant	of	
Qing-era	 feuding,	officials	 initially	 tracked	Hoklo,	Hakka,	 and	plains	Aborigine	 identity,	
but	after	1915—with	armed	resistance	by	Han	and	plains	Aborigines	ended	and	ongoing	
Austronesian	 resistance	 contained	 in	 the	 mountains—only	 distinctions	 between	
Japanese,	mountain	Aborigines,	and	an	amalgamated	“locals”	category,	which	I	refer	to	
as	“Bendi,”	 remained	salient	 (Brown	2004,	2010)	 (see	table	1).	Focusing	on	exports	 to	
offset	 Japan’s	 trade	 imbalances,	 the	 colonial	 government	monopolized	 opium	 (1897),	
camphor	and	salt	(1899),	sugar	(1905),	and	tobacco	(1906),	thereby	eliminating	Western	
involvement	in	these	trades	and	substantially	increasing	revenues	(Ka	1995,	52–55).	To	
entice	 Japanese	 capitalists	 to	 invest	 in	 sugar	 production,	 colonial	 administrations	
invested	 in	 infrastructure	 (dams	 and	 irrigation	 systems,	 industrial	 mills),	 technology	
(seedlings,	 fertilizer,	 crushing	 machines),	 even	 direct	 cash	 subsidies,	 and	 finally	
monopoly	zones.	Before	Japanese	capitalists	arrived	in	1906,	sugar	production	declined:	
the	amount	produced	in	1900	was	only	63	percent	of	what	had	been	produced	in	1895	
(Ka	1995,	75).15	Tea	continued	to	be	an	important	export	through	1910.		
The	post-1860	tea	trade	changed	the	face	of	northern	Taiwan,	not	only	deforesting	
the	hills	for	tea	plantations	and	making	towns	into	tea-processing	hubs	but	also	bringing	
many	Bendi	women	into	the	public-sphere	side	of	wage	labor.	Han	women’s	economic	
contributions	to	their	households	have	long	been	legion—as	well	as	underestimated	and	
undervalued—but	 in	 rural	 areas,	 such	 contributions,	 often	 in	 the	 form	 of	 homemade	
handicrafts	 and	 textiles,	 did	 not	 previously	 necessitate	 leaving	 the	 household	 (Brown	
2016,	2017;	Brown	and	Satterthwaite-Phillips	2018;	cf.	Bray	1997).	As	tea	became	Qing-
era	Taiwan’s	leading	export,	Westerners	built	warehouses	and	hired	Han	middlemen	to	
deal	with	 cultivation	 and	 processing.	 Americans	 and	 Europeans	 retreated	 to	 handling	
export	 shipping	when	 their	 former	 compradors	 outcompeted	 them	 at	 the	 local	 level.	
The	 river	 port	 of	 Dadaocheng	 became	 a	 boom	 town	where	 tea	 harvested	 in	 the	 hills	
around	the	Taipei	basin	was	brought	for	sorting,	processing,	and	shipment	to	the	coastal	
port	 of	 Danshui	 (figure	 3).	 Moreover,	 the	 tea	 industry	 apparently	 smoothed	 ethnic	
tensions	among	the	various	local	Han.16	
The	 post-1860	 demand	 for	 female	 labor	 ran	 from	 the	 hills	 to	 the	 river	 ports	
because	picking	tea	(leaf	by	leaf),	sorting,	and	processing	were	all	traditionally	women’s	
work	 (e.g.,	Chien	2015),	 though	men	also	processed	tea	(figure	4).	Women	could	earn	
good	wages	from	tea—enough	to	support	themselves	and	another	person	or	two—and	
by	1900,	thousands	were	doing	so	in	Dadaocheng	on	a	daily	basis	(Davidson	[1903]	1988,	
385–386;	 A.	 Wolf	 and	 Gates	 2005,	 121).	 This	 economic	 organization	 has	 major	
                                                     
15	By	1920,	sugar	was	more	than	70	percent	of	Taiwan’s	total	industrial	output	(Ka	1995,	75).	
Meanwhile,	by	1915,	camphor	fell	below	4	percent	and	tea	below	7	percent	(Ka	1995,	64).		
16	Dadaocheng’s	founding	resulted	from	Quanzhou-descended	Han	driving	Tongan-descended	
Han	out	of	Mengjia;	they	joined	Zhangzhou-descended	Han	downstream	in	what	became	
Dadaocheng	(A.	Wolf	and	Gates	2005,	115).	
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implications	 for	 not	 only	 household	 economics	 and	 power	 dynamics	 but	 also	
communitarian	 cosmopolitanism.	 Japanese-period	 demographic	 records	 show	 that	
almost	 all	 Han	women	 in	 towns	 (91	 percent)	 and	 rural	 areas	 (98	 percent)	 of	 Taiwan	
married,	 but	 in	 Taipei	 city	 almost	 23	 percent	 of	 women	 never	 married	 (A.	Wolf	 and	
Gates	 2005,	 119).	 This	 significantly	 lower	 marriage	 rate	 may	 be	 due	 to	 urban	 life	
generally	 (A.	Wolf	 and	 Gates	 2005,	 125,	 128),	 but	 not	 all	 urban	 wage	 labor	 brought	
women	into	common	public	spaces	with	the	same	frequency.		
	
	
	
Figure	4.	Bendi	women	and	men	sorting	tea	(1871).	This	illustration	for	a	Western	newspaper	
shows	Bendi	men	and	women	sorting	tea	in	an	outdoor	common	public	space	in	Danshui	(Tam-
sui).	Some	women	are	sitting	alone,	some	with	other	women,	and	some	with	men.	One	man,	
with	his	shirt	open	and	a	turban,	may	be	Austronesian.	Source:	Greey	(1871),	available	in	the	
Reed	College	digital	archive,	Formosa:	Nineteenth-Century	Images,	
https://rdc.reed.edu/c/formosa/s/r?_pp=20&query=tea&s=5ded2bcd5b8394afbf0e4c2b755ac5b
f70bcc1bf&p=1&pp=1.	
	
The	 wealthiest	 families	 claimed	 achievement	 of	 the	 Han	 (purportedly	 neo-
Confucian)	patriarchal	ideal	of	keeping	women	cloistered	within	their	household,	except	
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for	 occasional	 visits	 to	 temples.17	The	 daily	 work	 of	 women	 in	 non-elite	 households	
surely	 took	 them	 frequently	 outside	 the	 house—to	 stores	 or	 markets	 (whether	 for	
buying	 supplies	or	 selling	homemade	handicrafts).	 The	employment	 supported	by	 the	
sex	 trade	 in	Mengjia—not	only	prostitutes	and	brothel	owners,	but	also	 seamstresses	
and	 silver	 platers—was	 carried	 out	 largely	 behind	 closed	 doors.	 By	 contrast,	 the	 tea	
industry	 brought	 local	 women	 into	 Taiwan’s	 public	 sphere	 to	 such	 an	 extraordinary	
degree	that	it	was	noteworthy	to	contemporaneous	observers.	James	Davidson	([1903]	
1988,	385),	an	American	who	reported	on	Japanese	colonization	first	as	a	journalist	and	
later	a	diplomat,	wrote,	“During	the	summer	months,	nothing	is	more	striking	than	the	
crowds	of	girls”—he	estimated	a	daily	average	of	more	than	twelve	thousand—“who	at	
noon	and	night	simply	overrun	[Dadaocheng]”	(cf.	Lin	2001,	987).	
The	 growth	 of	 the	 tea	 industry	 correlates	 to	 the	 broad	 acceptance	 of	 Bendi	
women’s	 highly	 visible	 expansion	 in	 public-sphere	 wage	 labor.	 The	 global	 tea	 trade	
pervaded	northern	Taiwan	 society	during	 the	 late	Qing	period,	 extending	 into	 smaller	
towns	 and	 the	 rural	 hinterland.	 The	 socioeconomic	 and	 ecological	 shifts	 of	 the	 tea	
industry	 are,	 like	 other	 socioeconomic	 and	 ecological	 shifts,	 not	 simply	 top-down,	
externally	 driven	 processes.	 Rather,	 Bendi	 women	 and	 their	 families	 interacted	 and	
engaged	 with	 the	 larger	 political-economic	 (colonial	 and	 imperialist)	 forces	 that	
confronted	 them,	 and	 their	 micro-level	 agency—the	 niche-constructing	 actions	 of	
individuals	and	households—reconstituted	these	macro-level	processes	(cf.	Brown	2016,	
esp.	 519–527).	More	 and	more	 households—including	 its	 female	members—thus	 had	
quotidian	public	engagements	with	strangers	and	people	of	different	ethnic	groups	that	
are	so	fundamental	to	communitarian	cosmopolitanism.	
Japanese	 colonial	 policies	 continued	 to	 move	 Bendi	 women	 into	 public-sphere	
labor.	 In	 1915,	 the	 Japanese	 government	 added	 its	 ban	 on	 footbinding	 to	 the	 list	 of	
items	to	be	checked	during	semiannual	police	visits—when	 it	understood	that	women	
with	 bound	 feet	 would	 not	 work	 in	 the	 paddy	 fields	 (Brown	 2004,	 95,	 265n45).	
Implementation	of	the	ban,	as	intended,	expanded	women’s	participation	in	agriculture,	
moved	men	into	off-farm	wage	labor,	and	resulted	in	more	women	working	off	farms	as	
well.	Other	policies	helped	keep	women	in	the	public-sphere	workforce.	For	example,	in	
the	tobacco	monopoly,	women	were	granted	pregnancy	leave	and	the	right	to	continue	
working	after	marriage	(Brown	2010,	470).	Bendi	women	were	visible	 in	public-sphere	
employment	 throughout	 the	 Japanese	 period—in	 agricultural	 production	 (of	 rice,	 tea,	
and	even	sugarcane),	manufacturing,	clerical	work,	education,	and	medicine.	Although	
explicitly	 aimed	 at	 boosting	 productivity,	 this	 visibility	 also	 affected	 civil	 society—not	
only	expanding	women’s	quotidian	experience	 in	 the	public	 sphere	across	 classes	and	
                                                     
17	Accounts	of	such	cloistering	often	rely	on	patrilineage	genealogies.	Such	family	records	may	
expunge	not	only	women	(showing	fathers	giving	birth	to	sons)	but	also	unsavory	or	criminal	
elements	not	to	their	credit	(Meskill	1979,	65).	It	is	unlikely	that	they	recorded	women	departing	
from	neo-Confucian	ideals	unless	it	served	the	lineage.	Such	occasional	reports	raise	questions	
about	where	the	women	learned	the	necessary	skills—for	example,	recruiting	and	leading	troops,	
or	pursuing	four	legal	suits	(Meskill	1979,	162–175,	188).	
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regions	of	Taiwan	well	beyond	what	the	nineteenth-century	tea	industry	had	produced,	
but	also	promoting	such	participation	as	both	proper	and	“modern”	(cf.	Wang	W.	2014).	
	
Bendi	Women’s	Late	Twentieth-Century	Living	Rooms	as	Factories	
	
As	we	 come	 closer	 to	 the	 present	 day,	more	 information	 is	 available	 about	women’s	
thoughts	 and	 understandings	 of	 their	 relationship	 to	 work,	 the	 public	 sphere,	
community,	 and	 even	 cosmopolitanism.	 I	 continue	 to	 examine	 evidence	 of	
communitarian	 cosmopolitanism	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 quotidian	 engagements	 of	 most	
women—that	 is,	women	who	were	Bendi,	 not	 elite,	 not	 highly	 educated,	 and	 (during	
the	 immediate	 postwar	 period)	 predominantly	 rural—not	 merely	 to	 maintain	
comparability	 to	 earlier	 centuries	 lacking	 this	 information,	 but	 also	 to	 avoid	 the	
predominance	of	elite	women’s	views	even	during	the	twentieth	century	(e.g.,	Ku	1988,	
1989;	Chiang	1999;	Rubinstein	2004;	Lewis	2009;	Wang	W.	2014).		
The	 postwar	 transition	 to	 Nationalist	 (Kuomintang	國民黨,	 KMT)	 rule	 in	 Taiwan	
stymied	cooperation	across	diversity.	As	the	KMT	increasingly	lost	ground	in	the	Chinese	
Civil	War	on	the	mainland	(1945–1949),	 it	viewed	control	of	Taiwan	as	more	crucial	to	
its	survival,	and	Bendi	viewed	being	drawn	into	the	 lost	cause	with	greater	alarm.	The	
KMT	was	unable	 to	administer	Taiwan	competently	or	 fairly.	For	example,	 there	were	
outbreaks	of	malaria	when	the	KMT	loosened	Japanese	public-health	measures	and	also	
massive	confiscations	of	Bendi	property	by	KMT	officials	and	soldiers	at	all	levels	(e.g.,	G.	
Barclay	1954;	Gates	1987).	These	failures	exacerbated	the	huge	economic	challenges	of	
rebuilding	Taiwanese	 infrastructure	and	economic	 institutions	damaged	by	 the	war	as	
well	 as	 the	 challenges	 of	 resettling,	 feeding,	 and	 employing	 more	 than	 a	 million	
Mainlander	refugees.	Attitudes	quickly	polarized,	and	the	rapid	deterioration	to	violence	
galvanized	 as	 ethnic	 the	 sociopolitical	 distinction	 between	 Bendi	 (bensheng	 ren)	 and	
Mainlanders	(waisheng	ren)	(table	1;	Brown	2004,	2008,	2010).	Bendi	rebelled	beginning	
on	 February	 28,	 1947,	 and	 after	 KMT	 troop	 reinforcements	 arrived	 on	 March	 8,	
Mainlanders	 suppressed	 Bendi-armed	 resistance	 as	 brutally	 as	 the	 Japanese	 had	
decades	 earlier,	 extinguishing	 not	 only	 the	 rebellion	 but	 all	 expressions	 of	 dissent.	
Conservative	estimates	suggest	 that	 tens	of	 thousands	of	Taiwanese	 lost	 their	 lives	or	
were	jailed,	and	many	more	were	blacklisted	(T.	Lai,	Myers,	and	Wu	1991).	But	the	firm	
martial-law	 grip	 on	 Taiwan	 society	 did	 not	 stop	 the	 violence	 so	 antithetical	 to	
cosmopolitanism.	 In	 the	aftermath	of	 its	decisive	 civil	war	 loss,	 the	KMT	expanded	 its	
authoritarian	grip	on	the	peoples	in	Taiwan	during	the	early	1950s	with	the	White	Terror	
(Baise	 kongbu白色恐怖 )	 purges	 of	 KMT	 ranks,	 Mainlander	 refugees,	 and	 some	
Taiwanese.	 Neighbors	 informed	 on	 neighbors	 and	 people	 disappeared	 without	
explanation,	 their	 fates	 unknown	 sometimes	 for	 decades.	 In	 such	 a	 context,	 in	which	
one	 cannot	 trust	 neighbors,	 engagement	 across	 diversity	 is	 all	 but	 impossible.	
Cosmopolitanism	was	not	merely	at	a	nadir;	it	was	entirely	extinguished.	
Taiwan’s	 economic	 development	 from	 1950	 through	 1987	 has	 been	 hailed	 as	
miraculous	 (e.g.,	 Gold	 1986;	 Rubinstein	 1999).	 But	 we	 need	 to	 recognize	 this	
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development	 as	 colonial	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 its	 social	 impacts—on	 the	
communitarian	 social	 engagements	 necessary	 for	 local	 cosmopolitanism	 and	 on	
transnational	 engagements	 fostering	 global	 cosmopolitanism—and	 how	 these	
influences	 were	 gendered.	 Taiwan’s	 economic	 miracle	 occurred	 under	 authoritarian	
(martial-law)	 rule	 by	 a	 Mainlander-dominated	 KMT	 that	 sought	 to	 use	 Taiwan’s	
population,	infrastructure,	and	natural	resources	to	serve	Mainlander	goals	and	needs.	
This	 Mainlander	 colonialism18	was	 neither	 the	 full-on	 settler	 colonialism	 of	 the	 Qing	
period,	which	displaced	 indigenous	Austronesians	 and	 transformed	ecosystems	across	
Taiwan,	 nor	 the	 imperial	 colonial	model	 of	 the	 Japanese	period,	which	 largely	 limited	
the	long-term	migrants	from	Japan	to	the	number	needed	to	extract	desired	resources.	
It	took	time	for	the	KMT	to	reorient	to	the	permanency	of	their	settlement	in	Taiwan.19	
The	one	to	two	million	Mainlander	officials,	troops,	and	refugees	were	outnumbered	by	
the	 six	 million	 people	 who	 had	 been	 Japan’s	 colonials,	 but	 with	 Mainlanders	
representing	 20	 to	 25	 percent	 of	 the	 resulting	 population,	 the	 discrimination	 that	
favored	 Mainlanders	 in	 almost	 every	 sphere	 was	 widely	 experienced.	 Moreover,	
Mainlander	 policies	 recognized	 little	 of	 the	 ethnic	 variation	 within	 Taiwan,	 lumping	
together	as	Bendi	all	but	mountain	Austronesians,	 inadvertently	promoting	 interethnic	
cooperation	 among	 Bendi,	 and	 contributing	 to	 the	 social	 experience	 of	 a	 distinct	
Taiwanese	identity	(Brown	2004,	2008,	2010).20	
It	was	not	Nationalist	policies	that	first	brought	women	into	Taiwan’s	public	sphere,	
though	it	may	have	seemed	that	way	to	planners	unaware	of	Taiwan’s	history.	Although	
women	retreated	from	outside-the-household	wage	employment	during	the	inflationary	
and	 incendiary	 context	 of	 the	 Cold	War,	White	 Terror	 period,	 Taiwanese	women	had	
been	visible	in	the	public	sphere	during	the	Japanese	period—in	agricultural	production	
(of	 rice,	 tea,	 and	 even	 sugarcane),	 manufacturing,	 clerical	 work,	 education,	 and	
medicine.	 Although	 little	 scholarship	 addresses	 women’s	 labor-force	 participation	 in	
Taiwan	 from	 1945	 to	 1960,	 there	 must	 have	 been	 strong	 pressures—including	
widespread	rhetoric	about	women	serving	the	nation	primarily	by	being	good	wives	and	
wise	mothers—pushing	women,	Bendi	and	Mainlander	alike,	out	of	the	workforce.	But	
KMT	policies	did	rely	crucially	on	women’s	labor	for	economic	development.	And	from	
1956	to	1966,	women	in	the	labor	force	rose	from	20	to	34	percent;	by	1973,	it	was	40	
                                                     
18	I	refer	to	this	colonial	effort	as	“Mainlander	colonialism”	because	it	favored	Mainlanders	in	
almost	every	sphere,	regardless	of	whether	they	were	KMT	members.	This	term	reminds	us	of	
the	tensions	that	could	accrue	in	quotidian	social	interactions	between	Mainlanders	and	Bendi.			
19	In	the	meantime,	both	Taiwan	and	Japan	were	effectively	within	the	U.S.	imperial	sphere.	
Taiwan	imported	textiles	and	fertilizer	from	Japan,	for	example,	in	1949–1951,	when	Taiwan	was	
still	reeling	from	the	flood	of	Mainlander	refugees,	and	during	the	KMT’s	1945–1949	focus	on	the	
Chinese	Civil	War	(P.	Wang,	1999,	338n24).	
20	Non-elite	Bendi	had	little	if	any	interaction	with	the	peoples	of	Qing	and	Republican	China	
during	the	Japanese	period.	(Chinese	sojourners	to	Taiwan	were	strictly	regulated,	though	many	
elite	Bendi	had	businesses	in	China	[e.g.,	Lin	2001].)	But	there	was	even	less	interaction	between	
Taiwan	and	China	under	Mainlander	colonialism.		
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percent;	 and	 by	 1986,	 45	 percent	 (Greenhalgh	 1985,	 273;	 Gallin	 1989,	 374).	 Their	
contributions	on	farms	and	in	manufacturing	are	undervalued	(but	see	Greenhalgh	1985,	
272–73)	at	 least	 in	part	because	they	came	mostly	from	ordinary,	not-highly-educated	
Bendi	women.		
Beginning	around	1950,	Mainlander	policies	moved	men	 into	off-farm	wage	 labor	
and	 feminized	 agriculture.	 Land	 reform,	 carried	 out	 in	 the	midst	 of	 the	White	 Terror	
purges,	first	(in	1949)	reduced	rents	then	(in	1951)	put	ownership	of	small	plots	of	land	
into	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 families	 who	 actually	 farmed	 it,	 something	 for	 which	 I	 heard	
farmers	 still	 expressing	 gratitude	 in	 the	 early	 1990s.	 Landholding	 limits	 shifted	 Bendi	
elites’	 investments	to	 industry	and	also	meant	that	farming	families	needed	additional	
off-farm	wage	 income	to	make	ends	meet	(e.g.,	Gates	1987;	P.	Wang	1999,	324–325).	
Because	 these	 policies	 effectively	 feminized	 agricultural	 labor,	 the	 rice-crop	 yield	
increases	(of	37	percent!)	that	occurred	over	the	decade	following	land	reform	(Rigger	
2014,	47)	have	to	be	understood	as	relying	not	only	on	the	land-to-the-tiller	policy	and	
green-revolution	technology	but	also	on	Bendi	women’s	labor.		
Around	1960,	 rural	Bendi	women	made	visible	 contributions	 to	 their	households,	
but	 it	 did	 not	 bring	most	 of	 them	 high	 status	 or	 power	 in	 household	 dynamics	 (e.g.,	
Harrell	[1982]	2015;	Lu	Y.	1984;	however,	rural	women’s	status	has	changed,	e.g.,	Lai	E.	
1997).	 Although	 families	 readily	 made	 women	 the	 managers	 of	 household	 finances,	
when	they	had	the	best	skills	(Cohen	1976),	women	were	still	largely	dependent	on	the	
loyalty	 of	 their	 sons	 to	 gain	 substantial	 authority	 (M.	Wolf	 1968,	 1972;	 A.	 Wolf	 and	
Huang	 1980).21	The	 commonly	 expected	pattern	was	 for	 unmarried	 daughters	 to	 help	
with	farmwork,	housework,	and	childcare	through	their	years	of	compulsory	education.	
Then,	 between	 completion	 of	 schooling	 and	marriage,	 they	 would	 work	 where	 there	
was	the	greatest	familial	need	or	the	highest	available	pay.	A	well-paying	job	had	long	
been	recognized	as	a	way	to	stave	off	an	unwanted	marriage	(e.g.,	A.	Wolf	and	Huang,	
1980).		
In	 the	 1960s,	 national-level	 economic	 plans	 to	 shift	 from	 import	 substitution	 to	
export-oriented	manufacturing	drew	unmarried	young	women,	mostly	Bendi	and	many	
rural,	 into	 factory	work,	 leaving	agriculture	 to	married	women.	The	majority	of	never-
married	women	 (age	 15	 and	 older)	 participated	 in	wage	 labor:	 57.3	 percent	 in	 1967,	
62.3	 percent	 in	 1973,	 58.5	 percent	 in	 1984,	 and	 54.6	 percent	 in	 1988	 (Hsiung	 1996,	
40).22	The	participation	of	 teenage	 girls	 (15–19	 years	 old)	was	 particularly	 high	during	
the	1970s,	rising	from	34.9	percent	in	1970,	to	55.2	percent	in	1975,	and	67.9	percent	in	
1980	 (Hsiung	 1996,	 38;	 cf.	 Harrell	 1981,	 36).	 These	 jobs	 constituted	 hard,	 exhausting	
work	 (e.g.,	 Kung	1976,	 1983;	Hsiung	1996).	And	 although	newspapers,	 television,	 and	
textbooks	 suggested	 that	 such	 work	 was	 a	 temporary	 phase	 of	 women’s	 lives,	 to	 be	
ended	by	marriage	(Harrell	[1982]	2015,	63;	Greenhalgh	1985,	272),	the	fact	that	many	
                                                     
21	Thus,	much	postwar	women’s-studies	scholarship	in	and	about	Taiwan	focuses	on	women’s	
roles	within	the	family	or	efforts	to	overcome	the	limitations	of	these	roles	(Lee	1996).	
22	The	decrease	in	percentage	from	1973	to	the	1980s	probably	reflects	more	teenage	girls	
attending	high	school.		
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women	 pursued,	 even	 paid	 on	 their	 own	 for,	 education	 and	 training	 beyond	 the	
minimum	 necessary	 for	 their	 jobs	 (Kung	 1976,	 1983;	 Greenhalgh	 1985,	 299–300)	
indicates	women’s	recognition	that	their	work	lives	would	extend	beyond	marriage.	This	
pursuit	 demonstrates	 their	 agency	 in	 seeking	 to	 improve	 the	 circumstances	 of	 that	
future	employment.		
Among	those	working	“out,”	the	ability	to	go	home	varied	by	region,	factory,	and	
time	 period.	 In	 the	 early	 1960s,	 there	 were	 few	 large-scale	 factories,	 and	 they	 were	
primarily	 in	urban	areas,	 so	although	 some	workers	might	 live	at	home,	most	 lived	 in	
dormitories—returning	home	weekly	perhaps,	if	they	lived	within	an	easy	bus	distance,	
but	 only	 a	 few	 times	 a	 year	 if	 their	 homes	 were	 more	 distant	 (Kung	 1976,	 39;	
Greenhalgh	1985,	294).	Starting	in	1984,	workers	were	legally	entitled	to	four	Sundays	
off	each	month,	which	large	factories	with	multiple	shifts	honored,	but	smaller	factories	
often	required	twenty-eight	days	of	work	per	month	(Hsiung	1996,	113,	119;	Gallin	1989,	
380).	In	1987,	when	time	off	commonly	began	Saturday	afternoon,	I	saw	bus	and	train	
stations	 regularly	 congested	 with	 workers	 going	 home	 as	 well	 as	 an	 entire	 street	 of	
living-room	 factories	 with	 workers	 assembling	 light	 bulbs	 through	 Saturday	 evenings.	
Workers	might	take	extra	days	off	during	harvests,	but	they	risked	being	laid	off	or	fined	
(Kung	 1976,	 54–55n14;	 Hsiung	 1996,	 115–118).	 In	 1991,	 when	 many	 workers	 had	
motorcycles,	 I	 saw	 one	 small	 rural	 village’s	 population	 expand	 considerably	 on	
weekends	with	returning	workers.		
Thus,	 the	 feminization	 of	 agriculture	 did	 not	 just	 affect	 farmwork.	 Bendi	 rural	
women	ran	households	and	conducted	whatever	business	could	not	wait	for	returning	
workers—engaging	 daily	with	marketplace	 and	 itinerant	 vendors,	 schoolteachers,	 and	
postal	workers,	 in	addition	to	making	the	many	routine	decisions	required	 in	the	daily	
operation	 of	 a	 farm	 and	 household	 (e.g.,	 Harrell	 [1982]	 2015).	 Bendi	 women	 had	 no	
choice	but	to	be	active	social	participants	in	rural	communities	once	most	rural	men	had	
found	off-farm	wage	employment.	
Such	local,	rural	engagements	do	not	constitute	the	kind	of	social	interactions	that	
we	 usually	 consider	 cosmopolitan—they	 are	 communitarian	 engagements,	 but	we	 do	
not	 usually	 think	 of	 cross-gender	 interactions	 as	 representing	 diversity.	 Nevertheless,	
we	can	see	that	making	the	village-level	public	sphere	a	place	where	most	local	women	
routinely	 enact	 communitarian	 social	 engagements	 while	 creating	 household	
connections	to	a	larger	regional	(or	even	national)	public-sphere	wage-labor	workforce	
creates	at	 least	 the	potential	 for	 communitarian	 cosmopolitanism	writ	 large.	As	 these	
daily	 interactions	 expand—with	 industrialized	 transportation,	 for	 example—they	 cross	
lines	 of	 emically	 salient	 difference.	 Taiwan’s	 economic	 miracle	 built	 further	 on	 that	
potential.			
The	 1968	 Living	 Rooms	 as	 Factories	 (Keting	 ji	 gongchang	客廳即工廠)	 program	
explicitly	 targeted	 married	 women,	 urban	 as	 well	 as	 rural,	 whom	 planners	 blindly	
considered	 “idle,”	 as	 surplus	 labor	 (Hsiung	 1996,	 52).23	There	 may	 have	 also	 been	 a	
                                                     
23	Other	mainland-origin	leaders	also	failed	to	credit	women’s	contributions:	in	the	inscription	for	
the	first	(July	20,	1949)	issue	of	Women	of	New	China	(Xin	Zhongguo	funü	新中国 女),	Mao	
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presumption	 that	 Bendi	 women	 were	 docile,	 easy	 “victims”	 of	 exploitation	 (cf.	
Greenhalgh	 1985,	 301,	 303;	 Gallin	 2012:	 163–164).	 But	 the	 government	 took	 no	
chances—strikes	 and	 labor	 protests	 were	 illegal	 under	 Mainlander	 colonial	 rule,	 and	
labor-protection	 laws,	 including	 the	 right	 to	 unionize,	 did	 not	 apply	 to	 factories	 with	
fewer	 than	 thirty	 workers	 (Gallin	 1989,	 381;	 Hsiung	 1996,	 esp.	 chap.	 2)—that	 is,	
factories	small	enough	to	operate	out	of	living	rooms.	Married	women’s	participation	in	
Taiwan’s	labor	force	grew	from	27.2	percent	in	1967	to	35.3	percent	in	1973,	39	percent	
in	1984,	and	42.7	percent	in	1987	(Hsiung	1996,	40).	By	1987,	56.5	percent	of	married	
women—in	contrast	to	34.3	percent	of	single	women—working	in	manufacturing	were	
employed	 at	 satellite	 factories	 with	 fewer	 than	 thirty	 workers	 (Hsiung	 1996,	 77;	 cf.	
Harrell	 1981,	 36–38;	 Harrell	 [1982]	 2015,	 66–71;	 Gallin	 1989,	 379–381).	 This	 “living-
room”	piecework	 system	continued	 through	 the	1990s,	even	after	 the	end	of	 colonial	
rule	(Hsiung	1996;	Skoggard	1996;	Simon	2005).	
Government	 statistics	 undercount	 married	 women’s	 labor	 in	 satellite	 factories	
because	 they	 undercount	 female	 family	 members	 working	 without	 pay	 in	 family-run	
living-room	factories,	erroneously	counting	them	as	housewives	(Hsiung	1996,	43)	and	
considering	 their	 labor	 to	 be	 merely	 “helping”	 with	 work	 credited	 to	 the	 household	
head. 24 	Although	 men	 usually	 held	 legal	 title	 to	 a	 living-room	 operation,	 women	
regularly	 acted	 as	 proprietors—setting	 the	 production	 pace	 by	 their	 own	 work	 or	
interspersing	workers	paid	by	 the	piece	among	workers	paid	a	daily	wage	to	ensure	a	
faster	 pace	 (Hsiung	 1996,	 104–107,	 121–123).	 Women	 proprietors	 also	 conducted	
necessary	 “outside”	 interactions—for	 example,	 with	 factory	 representatives	 to	
negotiate	 schedules,	orders,	 and	wages	 (Harrell	 1981,	37–38;	Harrell	 [1982]	2015,	67)	
(see	figure	5).	This	agency	does	not	deny	that	women	faced	discrimination.	There	was	a	
clear	gender	gap	in	pay;	for	example,	women’s	wages	were	lower	than	those	of	men	in	
the	same	position,	and	women	who	belonged	to	the	satellite	factory	owner’s	household	
often	were	not	paid	wages	at	all	(Hsiung	1996,	41,	42–43,	45,	104).	But	Bendi	women’s	
labor-force	 participation	 expanded	 women’s	 experience	 and	 social	 engagement	 and	
made	living	rooms	into	common	public	spaces.		
It	was	not	only	proprietors	who	became	cosmopolitan	agents	by	expanding	 their	
social-engagement	skills.	Wage	workers	also	had	to	learn	these	skills,	not	least	because	
women	 in	 general	 (and	 especially	 older,	married	women)	were	 perceived	 as	 “docile”	
(Simon	 2005,	 106–110;	 cf.	 Greenhalgh	 1985,	 305).	Whether	 satellite	 employees	were	
owners’	 kin	 or	 not,	 they	 had	 to	 learn	 to	 negotiate	 their	 work	 as	 waged	 or	 unwaged	
(often	 within	 the	 idiom	 of	 “helping”),	 and	 the	 implications	 for	 their	 status	 in	 the	
                                                                                                                                                 
Zedong	(1966,	554–555)	exhorted	women	to	“unite	and	take	part	in	production”	(tuanjie	qilai,	
canjia	shengchan...	huodong	团结起来，参加生产。。。 活动)	as	if	women’s	labor	had	never	
before	produced	anything	significant.		
24	The	idiom	of	“help”	(bangmang	幫忙)	is	often	used,	even	by	women	themselves,	in	ways	that	
mask	and	undervalue	women’s	work	(Brown	2017).	The	use	of	“help”	to	describe	women’s	work	
in	Taiwan	probably	reflects	Taiwanese	women’s	own	descriptions	(e.g.,	Kung	1976,	46;	Gallin	
1989,	377,	379–380;	Chien	2015,	44,	45,	53).		
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household,	 where	 non-kin	 or	 extended	 family	 might	 board	 (Hsiung	 1996,	 131–132).	
Women	workers	were	hardly	docile	(cf.	Simon	2005,	109).	They	learned	to	“wrangle”—
use	 barbed	 conversation,	 sometimes	 cooperatively,	 to	 improve	 their	 pay,	 resist	
exploitative	 requests,	 or	 embarrass	 the	 boss	 (Hsiung	 1996,	 134–35).	 Difficult	 work	
conditions	 contributed	 to	 women’s	 outspokenness	 and,	 in	 a	 favorable	 labor	 market,	
they	were	 sometimes	willing	 to	 risk	 being	 fired	 (Gallin	 1989,	 380;	 cf.	 Kung	 1976,	 48).	
These	kinds	of	 social-engagement	 skills,	 learned	 in	wage	 labor,	 are	at	 least	marginally	
cosmopolitan	in	their	own	right	because	they	require	sufficient	cooperation	to	result	in	
a	marketable	 product.	 In	 addition,	 these	 engagements	 set	 up	 a	 potential	 for	 greater	
cosmopolitanism	if	workers	use	these	skills	elsewhere.		
	
	
	
Figure	 5.	 Bendi	 woman	 negotiating	 payment	 with	 factory	 representatives,	 1973.	 The	 woman	
facing	the	camera	is	a	proprietor,	with	her	husband	(not	pictured),	of	a	small-scale	knitting	mill	
(between	two	and	four	hand-operated	machines)	in	Ploughshare	village,	in	northern	Taiwan.	She	
is	negotiating	with	putting-out	factory	representatives	for	payment	for	the	piecework	stacked	on	
the	ground.	Source:	Stevan	Harrell,	used	with	permission.	
	
Non-elite,	 mostly	 Bendi	 women	 simultaneously	 made	 significant	 economic	
contributions	 and	 became	 cosmopolitan	 actors	 by	 earning	 wages	 in	 common	 public	
spaces—and	by	creating	common	public	spaces	in	living	rooms.	Bendi	women	managing	
farms,	 working	 “out”	 in	 their	 youth,	 and	 bringing	 factories	 into	 their	 living	 rooms	
contributed	importantly,	albeit	on	a	very	local	scale	in	terms	of	the	individuals	involved,	
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to	a	much	larger	communitarian	engagement	that	enabled	Taiwan’s	postwar	economic	
and	cosmopolitan	development.		
One	 extraordinary	 example	 of	 Bendi	 women	 using	 social-engagement	 skills	 to	
foster	a	 larger	communitarian	cosmopolitanism	is	the	Tzu	Chi	Foundation	(Ciji	 jijinghui	
慈 濟 基 金 會 ,	 Buddhist	 compassion	 relief	 foundation).	 This	 now-international	
philanthropic	organization	was	founded	in	1966	by	Buddhist	Dharma	Master	Cheng	Yen	
證嚴,	 a	 Bendi	woman,	with	 a	membership	 of	 thirty	 “housewives”	 in	 Hualian.	 Tzu	 Chi	
reports	its	origins	as	fundamentally	cosmopolitan:	an	encounter	between	Master	Cheng	
Yen	and	 some	Catholic	 nuns	who	accepted	Buddhism’s	high	principles	but	 challenged	
her	to	recount	organized	Buddhist	compassion	for	the	poor	and	needy,	and	the	death	of	
an	 Austronesian	 woman	 who	 was	 turned	 away	 from	 a	 hospital	 in	 eastern	 Taiwan	
because	of	 her	 inability	 to	pay	 for	 care.	 Tzu	Chi	 provides	 aid	 and	medical	 care	 across	
differences	 of	 all	 kinds.	 It	 grew	 to	 eight	 thousand	members	 by	 1986,	 four	million	 by	
1994,	 and	 it	 now	claims	more	 than	 ten	million	members	worldwide	 in	 fifty	 countries,	
operating	 a	 university,	 multiple	 hospitals	 and	 clinics,	 disaster-relief	 teams,	 and	
environmental	 protection	 and	 recycling	 centers	 (http://www.tzuchi.org/).	 Its	
membership	 remains	 primarily	 women	 (about	 70	 percent),	 and	 its	 disaster	 relief	 and	
other	volunteer	work	bring	ordinary	Taiwanese	women	 into	the	public	sphere	 in	ways	
both	large	and	small,	even	as	it	presents	its	work	as	gender-neutral	(Weller	1999;	H.	Lu	
2016).	This	organization	illustrates	how	Taiwan’s	women—especially	Bendi—have	been	
at	 the	 heart,	 not	 only	 of	 Taiwan’s	 postwar	 economic	 development	 and	 concurrent	
globalization,	 but	 also	 of	 cosmopolitanizing	 these	 processes	 to	 link	 local	 communities	
across	differences	and	also	across	national	borders.		
	
Intersectional	Linkages	
	
Across	 these	 three	 examples,	 we	 see	women—considered	 local	 or	 indigenous	 by	 the	
globally	 connected	 economic	 planners—working	 actively	 in	 public	 common	 spaces	 in	
ways	 that	 foster	 communitarian	 ties.	 These	 are	 not	 the	 only	 possible	 examples	 of	
indigenous	 women’s	 contributions	 to	 cosmopolitanism	 in	 Taiwan,	 but	 they	 capture	
three	 critical	 periods	 and	 illustrate	 how	 women’s	 ties	 constitute	 linkages	 in	 a	 social	
structure	made	dynamic	at	least	as	much	by	the	aggregated	micro-level	agency	of	these	
local	 women	 as	 by	 the	 macro-level	 colonial	 projects	 of	 Dutch,	 Qing,	 Japanese,	 and	
Mainlander	 authorities.	 Austronesian	 women’s	 marital	 networks	 facilitated	
seventeenth-century	economic	and	military	cooperation.	Bendi	women’s	public-sphere	
work	processing	 tea	 fueled	 the	 late	nineteenth-century’s	 largest	export	and	expanded	
into	 other,	 “modern”	 export	 production	 through	 1945.	 Bendi	 women’s	 farm	
management	 and	 manufacturing	 work—even	 making	 living	 rooms	 into	 factories—
powered	 Taiwan’s	 late	 twentieth-century	 economic	 miracle.	 Interacting	 with	 colonial	
forces,	indigenous	women	recurrently	fostered	local	communitarian,	cooperative	ties.			
As	a	social	niche—an	inherited	social	structure	that	individuals	themselves	modify	
by	 their	 actions—communitarian	 cosmopolitanism	 requires	 people	 working	 across	
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diversity	 in	ways	that	create	and	maintain	community.	 It	 is	 fragile,	because	ties	across	
difference	 require	 effort—practice—in	 order	 to	 overcome	 the	 social	 discomfort,	 or	
sometimes	 even	 moral	 disapproval,	 that	 may	 come	 with	 unexpected	 customs	 or	
unexpected	responses	in	cross-cutting	social	interactions.		
But	 the	 historically	 contingent	 processes	 that	 both	 maintain	 and	 modify	 social	
systems	grant	 large	 impacts	 to	highly	visible	precedents.	The	visibility	of	Austronesian	
women	 in	 Taiwan’s	 public	 sphere	 probably	 lasted	 until	 at	 least	 1788—and	 perhaps	
much	 longer	 if	 nineteenth-century	 Austronesian	 uprisings,	 which	 were	 surely	 widely	
discussed,	were	also	associated	with	Austronesian	women’s	public-sphere	labor.	Bendi	
women’s	 post-1860	 visibility	 began	 in	 northern	 Taiwan	 with	 tea	 processing	 but	
expanded	 throughout	 Taiwan	 during	 Japanese	 rule.	 That	 highly	 visible	 public-sphere	
labor	 expansion	was	within	 living	memory	 of	 postwar	Mainlander	 demands	 on	 Bendi	
women’s	 contributions	 to	 economic	 development.	 These	 illustrations	 of	 Taiwan’s	
intersectional	 cosmopolitanism—Austronesian	 and	 Bendi	 women’s	 repeated	
contributions	to	communitarian	cosmopolitanism	in	Taiwan—provide	fertile	grounds	for	
further	empirical	and	theoretical	research.			
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